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ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a method for understanding the relationships among the various value systems that underlie administrative thinking. The system takes into account the psychological faculties affecting ethical decisions, the philosophical orientations involved, and distinctions between the concepts of "right" and "good." The paper opens with comments on the increasing concern over the character of the values currently underlying administrative practice. The paper then reviews the importance of using language clearly, distinguishing between the associations and assumptions attached to the language used to describe things and events, on one hand, and the actual nature of the things and events described, on the other. The paper makes its central proposal next, differentiating among value systems based in religion, existentialism, pragmatism, humanism, positivism, hedonism, and other belief systems; and among these systems' bases in the will, in reasoning or thinking, and in emotion. The paper then examines the roles of free will and determinism in these value systems, asserting that some degree of choice is available to administrators and that this choice should be exercised in the form of voluntary commitment to a value system. Noting that education is intrinsically philosophical, the paper asserts that society cannot be content with antiphilosophical educators. (PGD)

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The Value Bases of Administrative Action

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Paper presented in Symposium on Reestablishing Values in Organization and Administrative Theory at Conference of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, April 1986

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'Managerialism is one of the main philosophical issues of our times. Its orthodox values trivialize the human essence, diminish human dignity, and widen the gap between a privileged class of managers and the rest of the people. This orthodoxy must be revolutionized before a homegrown form of American totalitarianism emerges. . .'[1]

This rather startling, some might think extravagant, statement is from a respected scholarly journal (Administration and Society, Aug. 1985). Its author is Wm. G. Scott, an eminent figure in contemporary organization theory and business administration. His text Organizational America contains the central tenets of his philosophy of which the quotation captures the essence. That such a text should be popular at all[2] and that learned societies such as the American Academy of Management should entertain such philosophy is perhaps some kind of sign of the times. Here is another.

'We've fabricated a society of wolves and coyotes. . . . Why does anybody think we're better today than we were in the robber baron days?'

. . . . .

'I wonder if there are any rules at all now. . . . Do people care about anything else beyond being caught? Not from where I sit.'

This time the speaker is the very distinguished American writer Louis Auchincloss who from his unique standpoint both in the profession of law and from his own intimate observations of the upper strata of American society has felt compelled to arrive at these rather dismal conclusions. Success-oriented yuppies, materialistic hedonism and narcissism, loss of moral fibre and its replacement by ruthless careerism seem to characterize the judgments of his literary perception. Such perceptions cannot easily be discounted and they too are a sign of the times.

So again is that remarkable best-seller (to the astonishment of its authors and publisher alike) Peters and Waterman's In Search of

Excellence.[3] This book has been seized upon with avidity, not just by business administrators but by administrators of all sorts, from military men to educators and its appeal seems to lie in its emphasis, however naive, upon the problem of values. Let us note, however, in passing that the formulae of success which it offers are based upon a value definition of winning wherein the strict criterion is the making of consistent profits over extended periods of time.

Consider next that *sanctum sanctorum* of respectability in administrative research, the pages of Administrative Science Quarterly. Recently our colleague Peter Gronn has had an article there entitled "Talk as the Work: The Accomplishment of School Administration."[4] And we can find such titles there nowadays as 'More on Metaphor: Why We Cannot Control Tropes in Administrative Science.'[5] or 'The Romance of Leadership.'[6] Here too then, in what was a bastion of methodological conservatism there is movement, albeit it slight and obscure. A shift of concern towards the quasi-valuational and philosophical.

One could continue. Alisdair MacIntyre's book After Virtue[7] which has so impressed Professor Holmes in Toronto.[8] Professor Duke's work in Oregon on the *aesthetics* of leadership.[9] Recent symposia in Australia and Canada.[10] The entire oeuvre of T. B. Greenfield. "In sum, a growing concern about the value bases of administration in general." As well as, but perhaps less so, of educational administration in particular. My wish is to enhance this concern through the consideration of the general problem of value in administrative life.

The Rectification of Names

Any consideration of value presents us at once with a semantic problem. Confucius in classical China and Wittgenstein in modern England were worlds and ages apart but each saw clearly that our "intelligence was bewitched by language."[12] This led the former to expound the doctrine of the Rectification of Names.[13] In essence this means that if a name such as, say, *school* has come to be applied to an organization which is *not* a school in the original sense, but rather, shall we say, an arrangement for child-holding, job preparation, and social conditioning then one of three things must occur before rational discourse about schooling can take place. Either the school should cease to do those things which are not-school. Or the school should cease to call itself a school and call itself what it now is, say, a care centre or social programming unit. Or the shift in language should be acknowledged so as to accommodate the change in meaning and we now all understand what the name properly signifies.

Likewise, if a leader is defined by the attributes of being a gentleman and a man of honour, and if our leaders in fact are liars, rogues, and Philistines, then we should cease to call them leaders and instead call them what they are, say, manipulators. Or we should require them to cease being manipulators. Or we should embrace the linguistic shift so that henceforth leader *means* manipulator.

Of course both Confucius and Wittgenstein fully understood that 'the meaning of a word was its use' and that 'the limits of one's language were the limits of one's world.'[12] This was precisely their point. Both saw clearly that progress in administration or out of it could not be made until we got the names straight. Otherwise, there is likely to be more

noise than signal in the communication process. Sensible discourse fails, fallacies flourish, meaning evaporates, and translation becomes an academic growth industry. Worst of all, the value bases of our forms of life are undermined.

The Demystification of Leadership

Nowhere is this unfortunate heritage of Babel more evident than in the attempted discourse (I would like to say domain of study) about leadership. The word leadership has become an incantation for the bewitchment of the led.[14] Yet is there an administrator anywhere who does not lay claim to the mantle of leadership?--and thereby to the manifold and great virtues embedded in the concept and its myth.[6] How often is this mythology used to justify and engorge the executive salary? How often too do we hear the plaint: What this nation (or organization, or school, or district) needs now is leadership? But this usage is, upon analysis, obfuscation. At best it is evocation. At worst an attempt to cast a magical spell on selected victims such as voters. Or search committees or persons with the power to appoint.

I would argue that upon proper analytical demystification the term leadership can be seen to be equivalent to administration. I have made this case elsewhere[15] and the rectification of names, which it implies, can greatly relieve us of a plethora of confusion. Confusion which is not only conceptual but which, because of its insidious distortion of our value bases, again and again leads us as followers to subject ourselves to the influence and power of dangerous men. The call for leadership is merely a cry for good administration as opposed to bad. And this in turn leads us to seek rectification of the names of value: good and bad, right and

wrong. How might we attempt this sort of rectification?

The Value Bases

The chief difficulty with getting the names straight about value is that the central term is itself profoundly ambiguous. One can usefully define value as a conception of the desirable with motivating force but 'desirability' conceals a fundamental distinction: the difference between good and right, between what we merely like and what *ought* to be. The great question then becomes, How do we know or ground both what is good and what is right? and it is the philosophical wrestling with this question that has led me to propound the value paradigm illustrated in the diagram[16] below:

Value Type	Grounds of Value	Psychological Faculty	Philosophical Orientations	Value Level
I	PRINCIPLES	conation willing	religion existentialism intuition	I
IIA	CONSEQUENCE (A)	cognition reason	utilitarianism pragmatism humanism democratic liberalism	II
IIB	CONSENSUS (B)	thinking		
III	PREFERENCE	affect emotion feeling	behaviourism positivism hedonism	III

RIGHT ↑ ↓ GOOD

I have applied the term paradigm to this display mainly because it has so far withstood any philosophical assault, Professor Evers notwithstanding,[17] and because it has received some measure of empirical as well as intuitive support.[18] This is not to say that it is logically, psychologically, or philosophically invincible but that it is a conceptual device at least as persuasive as that associated with Maslow's theory of motivation.[19]

If then this paradigm accurately maps the realm of value we have achieved a first stage in the Rectification of Names. Such a clarification does not, of course, entail an end to dispute. Our Antipodean colleagues [10,17], for example, seem to have developed an antipathy towards Type I values that is compounded by a difficulty or failure in discriminating between Level I and Level III affect. Their problem can also be understood as confusion between transrational and subrational (or pre-rational) levels of value conducing to what Wilber brilliantly analyzes as the pre-trans fallacy.[20]

While Wilber contrasts Freud and Jung as representative of different sides of this fallacy, the former reducing all values to the subconscious imperium of the id, the latter including the id-generated values in a numinous transpersonal dimension of collective mind. To use vague but traditional terms, God and Conscience vanish on the one hand into the most primitive of archaic impulses--clearing the ground for scientific determinism and behaviorism--and on the other hand they vanish into an inaccessible universal unconscious Mind. Again clearing the ground for positivistic interpretations of value since, as Jung points out, the thing about the unconscious is, in the end, that it really *is* unconscious. In either event, through the operation of this fallacy, the great psychologists have effectively undermined our value bases and I think the following quotation captures the sense of conventional psychological wisdom,

> *'Man is basically a battlefield. . ., a dark cellar in which a well-bred spinster lady and a sex-crazed monkey are forever engaged in mortal combat, the struggle being refereed by a rather nervous bank clerk.'*[21]

Though painfully accurate I do not think this is too helpful for the

praxis of administration and therefore I would like to reformulate the problem of value bases in terms of a conflict between Type I Existentialist Voluntarism and Type III Behavioristic Determinism. (The latter, it can be noted, has been a chief by-product of Freud, Marx, and the Wienerkreis.) In between, of course, is the Type II domain of pragmatic incrementalism and general bureaucratic-legalistic value behaviour.

This way of looking at the problem of values leads us to contrast the fallacy (trans-fallacy) of the existentialist belief that we are entirely responsible for all of our emotions with the equally fallacious (sub-fallacy) of the determinists that any value action is a pre-determined vector-resultant of internal unconscious motivations. I would argue both these extremes, though fallacious, contain truth. The strength of the first fallacy (I) is that indeed we *can* on occasion be responsible for and in control of our affect. We *can*, that is, be free to *consciously* choose between Option A and Alternative B. The strength of the other fallacy (III) is that it is powerfully true that we are much less free than we think and that, perhaps most of the time, we really do not have an actively aware, conscious option between Choices A and B. In other words we are *moved* rather than *moving*. Every administrator has surely experienced at some time this impotence, and yet, perhaps, on some other occasion, the existential Angst that accompanies the power of free choice and total responsibility.

Let me put it this way. Only God is free; only Matter is determined. Man shares the substance of the latter and the Ideal of the former. In terms of the value paradigm the human project is to approach Level I from Levels II and III; that is, the human project can be conceived as an

Evolution of the Will. Now this, in turn, is virtually identical to the highest project of moral education. To stay put at Level II, the administrative norm, the neo-Deweyian norm of the Australian School, is merely to sell the moral project short, and humanity short along with it. And because Way from III to I, and the means to the highest ends involve the raising of consciousness and the exercise of the will this leads me to conclude that the chief characteristic of the ethical administrator is that he seeks to increase his own degrees of freedom and the degrees of freedom of those who function under his aegis. Which is another way of saying that he actively strives to enlarge his consciousness, extend his intellectual scope, and master his own passions.

Type II Bases

The foregoing discussion has dealt with the affective side of value in contrast to the cognitive or the rational approach endorsed by the pragmatists, the consensualists, and the utilitarians. This is the modal realm of bureaucratic administrative praxis. It has a natural appeal because of the sanitary and antiseptic appearance of being grounded in logic in contrast to the messiness and unpredictable irrationality associated with Type III and Type I values. It avoids passion, grand or sordid. It lays claim to all the cachet attaching to reason and moderation.

The thrust to a rationality of value, to Type II values, is greatly reinforced by the characteristics of contemporary culture. That culture comprises large-scale bureaucracies, increasingly large and complex human organizations, massive government affecting to pursue rational policies, an enormous infrastructure of science and technology with their accompanying

ideologies of hyperrationality so convincingly depicted by Habernas,[22] Marcuse,[23] and, in our own field, by Allison.[24] All of this is greatly accentuated by the advent of an applied computerology resulting from large-scale entrepreneurial investment and stemming from research in the military domain. My typifying of our society as technocratic, bureaucratic, and neo-feudalistic[25] is perhaps not so overwrought as it might seem on first face. The value paradigm acknowledges the place of thinking in valuing but, as thinking becomes increasingly constrained by and patterned upon the machine and the now ubiquitous green eye of the cathode-ray tube so might we reasonably expect an increasing but subtle rationalization of value. The paradigm would equally predict, however, that this dominant base of value in the late 20th Century would give rise to countervailing affective reactions. Astrology blossoms in concert with orbiting satellites and space exploration. Yet each of us is now a set of binary data in some computer mainframe, our statistical identities indexed by our social insurance numbers, and if we are not to submit altogether to this overwhelming impress of rationality; if we are not to surrender ourselves passively to the tides of culture that sweep us along, what are we to do? What alternatives do we have, short of conformism or subrational rebellion? The logic of the paradigm contains alternatives of which I would like to briefly examine two.

Options

In a recent reply to critics[26] I have suggested that the philosophy of administration, and *a fortiori* educational administration, can and must move beyond mere pragmatism or positivism. Let me elaborate on this point.

It is easy for administrators to take their guiding values implicitly

from their culture and explicitly from their governors. In the former case tacit and implicit directions are taken from contemporary cultural norms: (at the time of writing) multiculturalism is good, apartheid is evil, greed is great. This can be done unconsciously and unreflectively simply because no time is allowed for reflection (the tyranny of the urgent), nor is energy available for expenditure on cultural critique.[27] Moreover, a solid sense of security is provided by the Type IIb impress and the inauthentic false consciousness of being representative of the general will. In the latter case value direction is taken from the external governors--boards, politicians, vocal pressure groups--and value autonomy or responsibility is abdicated. In effect the administrator approximates the model of Simon's bus driver[28] who asks not why he should go but where he should go. The value problem is elided in favour of a Type III positivistic solution.

In general there are two ways in which the administrator can establish value bases for himself which can serve to liberate him from the ordinary state of affairs described above. These can be called the sacred and the secular or, in terms of the value paradigm, Type I and Type IIA modes respectively.

The sacred alternative requires the voluntary acquisition of some sort of Type I commitment. This may be religious or it may be ideological. The devout Catholic and the committed Communist are at one in the quality of their allegiance. It is important to add that the commitment must be authentic and one has to discriminate carefully between the man of faith, the true believer on the one hand and the zealot or enthusiast who is merely heavily programmed or indoctrinated on the other. The former acts freely and consciously, the latter involuntarily and by reflex.[29]

Of course, such an option does not come without a price. A price which many or most might be unwilling to pay or even to contemplate. Radical demands will be made upon the psyche and, in return, there is a conversion or alteration of the depth personality structure which, I would argue, tends to be perceived as an intensification of moral integrity or authenticity. This subtle but profound characterological shift confers upon the administrator the power to challenge effectively the value forces which swirl around him. I would go further and hypothesize that it is this very value phenomenon which is at the root of charismatic leadership. Charisma is rooted in Type I values.

The second alternative we can consider involves almost as strong a commitment as that just described but this time the commitment is not to any transrational ideal but rather to the rational forms of life associated with bureaucratic organization and culture. By this is not meant, of course, bureaucracy in any pejorative sense but, on the contrary, bureaucracy in the grand Weberian vision of the ideal type. That it is fair to credit the Chinese with the invention of bureaucracy (along with the mandarin and the civil service competitive exam) returns us to Confucius and his ethical doctrines.

The spirit of Confucianism is subtle and complex but essentially it is a value orientation which reveres the *rules of the game*. This severance is buttressed by a code of gentlemanly conduct and a love of tradition and the virtues associated with all that is classical and traditional. It provides a value base for administration by no means unique to the Chinese. Indeed it formed part and parcel of the British Imperial ethos in Victorian times[30] and its melody still lingers on and about the playing fields of

Eton. It may not be without significance that the sun began to set on the British Empire as the values so typical of Confucianism began to wane. And the rise to greater glory of the Japanese commercial and moral empire is surely not unassociated with its firm commitments to this value base. It is of interest, too, that McIntyre's book[7] is so evocative of many Confucian themes.

While the detail of this value orientation cannot be properly expounded here, pay-off or outcome of subscription to its general principles would seem to be similar to, though less colourful than, a Type I conversion. That is, more autonomy, more moral integrity, more characterological coherence is gained by the subscribing administrator. He is, as it were, elevated above his Type II peers. In consequence his authentic spirit of leadership and will to lead is enhanced. Such a leader may well "play to win" but is affectively unmoved if he loses. Or wins. He is not callously indifferent but honourably detached. His great reward is that this detachment, this 'art of indifference,'[31] tends to obviate psychological stress and any consequent fear of psychic disintegration or exhaustion. The practitioners of this Type IIa value system, like their Type I counterparts, are armoured by grace of the simple fact that they *have an ethic*.

I should conclude by reiterating that the two value bases which we have just briefly considered constitute just that: two of many options that are possible[32] and it follows that their exposition is illustrative and descriptive rather than prescriptive or hortatory.

Implications

Let me quote Scott at the end as I did at the beginning. This is his

response to the ills of the day as he perceives them:

> *'Let us, individually, undertake to establish within our professional schools of administration philosophical enclaves to examine the questions that are raised by the values and ethics of management. These groups may have to be informal at first. But if the experience with such groups at the University of Washington is any guide, they can be very stimulating and enlightening to students and faculty.*
>
> *'Let us establish within our professional associations such as the Academy of Management and the American Society for Public Administration forums for moral discourse. Further, let us encourage that such forums be included in the regular programs of national meetings.*
>
> *'Let us move toward a collaborative effort among the American Society for Public Administration, the Academy of Management, and the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business to establish an independent institute for philosophy and values in administration.'*

Such words repeat, *mutatis mutandis*, the ideas which Professor Greenfield and his followers, including myself, have been expressing in educational administration for many years. Surely these proposals can be applied with even more logical force in the field of educational administration, that is, within the administrative aspect of *education*. The reason for this is glaringly simple though not, most strangely, glaringly obvious. It is that education is by its very nature as a human project--perhaps even ultimately *the* human project--*intrinsically* philosophical. It is then the crassest Babbitry, the worst Philistinism, indeed it is a neo-barbarism to be content with educational leaders who are themselves neither philosophers nor schooled in philosophy but worse yet are anti-philosophical and anti-intellectual. It is a reality that such educational administrators exist and it is typical of them that they commit either the positivistic fallacy of assuming their art to be a science or the laisser faire fallacy of equating principles with pragmatism.

A word of caution. Lest it be thought that new value bases for administration can be constructed overnight it would be well to consider which school of thought currently occupies the high ground in philosophy *qua* philosophy, not to mention educational administration. It seems fair to say that logical positivism, logical empiricism, and their invariable outriders: materialistic pragmatism as evidenced by the Australian school and secular humanism in the Western liberal tradition--are very much at the roots of the conventional wisdom. In a recent work it has been asserted, for example, that the Harvard philosopher Willard Quine (often cited with reverence by Evers) is 'the most influential American philosopher of the last twenty years.'[33] And 'The best way to characterize Quine's world view is to say that . . . there is fundamentally only one kind of entity in the world, and that is the kind studied by natural scientists--physical objects; and second, that there is only one kind of knowledge in the world, and that is the kind that natural scientists have.'[34] As for pragmatism in the North American context we need only refer to the expressions of this position put forward by Professor Willower.[35]

It is worth reflecting carefully whether either of these value bases, pragmatism or positivism, can help us find our way. My own persuasion is that they only deepen the darkness of our times. We ought to go beyond positivism and pragmatism. We ought to explore all the possibilities of commitment and then commit ourselves. We ought to be intellectually active, not passive. Drivers, not driven. In the end we must seek virtue for it is certain that it will not be thrust upon us.

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